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• A woman injured 
by an AP mine. 
c/o NamPa/ Reports 
Demining Efforts in Namibia 
Previous mine clearance programs in Namibia started the country on a 
clear path towards demining success. Unfortunately, a current lack of funding 
and a spillover of the longstanding conflict in Angola have thwarted progress. 
by Whitney Tolliver, MAIC 
Overview of the Situation 
On May 14, 1998, during a cer-
emony marking the last minefield-clear-
ing task in the Ohangwena region of 
Namibia, General Jamerson, Deputy 
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Euro-
pean Command described rhe country as 
"a model for Africa and the world." ' The 
Namibian Defense Force (NDF) and 
Namibia police deminers, trained and 
supported by the governments of 
Namibia and rhe United States, success-
fully reduced the number of landmine 
casualties during a three-year demining 
program. The number of deaths due to 
landmines and UXO fell from 10 in 1994 
ro just one in 1997, a 90 percent reduc-
tion. The number of injuries dropped as 
well, although nor as dramatically. At the 
end of the General's speech he concluded, 
"The decline in casualties means rhar the 
citizens of rhe northern regions of Namibia 
are safer now than they were before and 
that human suffering 
has declined." 1 
Unfortunately, 
s in ce that time, the 
number of casualt ies 
has once again increased, 
especially In rh e 
northern regions of the 
country. At the end of 
1999, Namibia became 
subject to the terrors as-
sociated with the long-
standing conflict occur-
ring in the neighboring 
state of Angola. T he 
Angolan National 
Union for rhe Total In-
dependence of Angola 
(UNITA) rebel move-
men r crossed the border 
into the northeast re-
gions of the country, laying new mineflelds 
open ro innocent civilians. Thus, Namibia's 
prior goal of becoming one of rhe first 
countries in rhe world to successfully com-
ply with the Ottawa Treaty received a ma-
jor setback. As Colonel J.T. T heyse, Chief 
Inspector of Explosives for rhe govern-
ment of rhe Republ ic of Namibia stared 
in a report, "Up to the end of 1999, the mine 
problem in Namibia was finite and well-
known; it could be solved rapidly with 
appropriated measures."' Now the govern-
ment desperately needs renewed funding 
in order to clean up these new areas be-
fore officials can once again declare Namibia 
a model country on rhe road to success. 
History 
Before Namibia gained its indepen-
dence from South Africa in March 1990, 
the South African Defense Force (SADF) 
m ined the northern regions of rhe coun-
try heavily. By rhe end of 1986, more than 
352,000 square meters of minefields had 
been placed around eight military and 
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police bases, two water supply rowers and 
the pylons on the Ruacana high-tens ion 
power line.2 Fortunately, in most cases, 
the SADF properly marked, mapped and 
fenced in these minefields. 1 
First Phase of Mine 
Clearance 
With rhe implementation of United 
Nations Resolution 435 in 1989, South 
African troops conducted the first mine 
clearance project in Namibia. The pro-
cess they used involved driving heavy 
barrie tanks pulling grid rollers across 
designated m inefields and bases ro clear 
the areas. However, our of the 44,594 
landm ines laid, only 40,779 were neu-
tralized and 96 detonated. Over 2,479 
mines were left unaccounted for. 1 There-
fore, the first demining project concluded 
with only a 92 percent success rare. Even 
with the first phase of mine clearance 
completed, rhe country still had major 
landmine problems. 
After Namibia's independence from 
South Africa and rhe SADF's withdrawal 
in 1990, rhe number of casualties result-
ing from accidental detonations actually 
increased. The destitute population rook 
and removed fences marking the remain-
ing mi nefields for their own personal use, 
rhus allowing livestock and people to 
freely roam highly dangerous mined ar-
eas. Specifically, small, unprotected 
minefields were laid open around the 
pylons on the Ruacana high-tension 
power line. These fields contained 25-
30 plastic AP blast mines, and four to six 
J .69 all-metal bounding fragmentation 
mines. 1 As travel resumed in these areas, 
vehicles and people also detonated old, 
unmapped land mines placed along road-
ways and footpaths; rhe number of UXO 
victims increased significantly as well. 
After the war, hundreds of thousands 
of pieces ofUXO were left behind in the 
northern provinces along the border. 
Many local civilians joined in the lucra-
tive bur very dangerous business of col-
leering and removing them for Angolan 
and Namibian scrap dealers. As a result, 
... 
a new wave of civilians became UXO vic-
rims. However, amendments to Namibia's 
Arms and Ammunition Act have seriously 
curtailed rhe scrap business. 
Second Phase of Mine 
Clearance 
Ar the starr of rhe second phase of 
mine clearance, local companies were 
hired to conduct rhe removal process. 
Namibia Blasting Agents gained a con-
traer from South West African Water & 
Ele ctrici ty Supply Corporation 
(S WAWEK) to clear minefields sur-
rounding the Ruacana power lines. T hey 
used rhe same grid roller method as the 
SADF to clear the berms left next to rhe 
pylons. However, even after the final 
sweeping phases of the fields, unexploded 
landmines and UXO were found and 
detonated by civilians and livestock. 
Government Involvement 
As rhe second phase of rhe demining 
process was concluding, rhe Namibian 
government assumed the responsibility of 
all mine clearance and mine awareness 
programs. On May 19, 1992, a Namibia 
Cabinet resolution halted a second con-
traer for the clearance of minefields sur-
rounding former military bases by 
Namibia BlasringAgents. 1 The resolution 
instead gave the NDF the expl icit orders 
to clear all known minefields of AP mines 
and AT mines, and told the Explosives 
Unit of the Namibian police to remove 
and destroy all mi litary ordnance and 
UXO across the former war zone. Unfor-
tunately, both the NDF and the Explosives 
Unit lacked rhe suffic ient number of 
clearance experts and equipment neces-
sary to successfully complete rhe projects. 
The Ministry of Home Affairs also 
created rhe first Namibian Public Aware-
ness Campaign during rhis rime. Their 
goal was to inform the public of rhe dan-
gers of handling UXO and how to mark 
and report landmine and UXO findings 
to the proper authorities. While rhe NDF 
and the Explosives Unit struggled to find 
funding and demining expertise for their 
projects, the public awareness campaign 
received a great deal of national and in-
ternational attention. National radio and 
television services cooperated in launch-
ing the program whi le international 
newspapers broadcasred the dire situation 
the Namibian people faced. 
US. Involvement 
U.S. arrenrion focused on Namibia 
for two reasons. The first arose from the 
failed demining missions. The United 
Stares drew concern over the continued 
detonations of AP mines in supposedly 
"cleared" minefields. The second gener-
ated from the effective public awareness 
campaign. In response to their concerns, 
the United Stares signed rhe Memoran-
dum of Understanding with the govern-
ment of rhe Republic of Namibia in 
1995. As a result, the Demining Liaison 
Committee was formed, and rhe U.S. 
mil itary began training rhe NDF and 
Namibian police deminers. 
As the nvo governments worked to-
gether, minefields were cleared, fences 
were taken down and land was finally 
returned to rhe community. Towards rhe 
end of the project, as General Jamerson 
said during a final mine clearing cer-
emony in 1998, officials had great hopes 
for Namibia. The country was almost 
completely mine-free and rhe NDF and 
the police Explosives Unit were properly 
trained in landmine clearance. The offi-
cial U.S.-sponsored demining program 
concluded on February 8, 2001, bur at 
the rime of their withdrawal, rhe United 
Stat es donated more than $2 million 
(U.S.) in earthmoving equipment, detec-
tion devices, computers and radio com-
munication equipment ro the NDP 
Current Status 
Although demining efforrs increased 
with U.S. involvement, rhe current num-
ber of casualties has recently risen in rhe 
northern regions of Namibia, most no-
tably the regions ofKavango and Capri vi. 
In 1997, landmine casualties were li sted 
as one killed and I 0 injured for the year.' 
Bur during the following year, these num-
bers increased ro three killed and 22 in-
jured and police reports from 2000 indicate 
14 killed and 125 injured from landmines.3 
In addition to an increase in the 
number of casualties, rhe types of inci-
dents responsible for landmine civilian ca-
sualties have changed p ercentage-wise. 
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From June 1989 to December 1999, 
UXO accounted for 87.4 percent of all 
landmine incidents, AP mines for 5.8 per-
cent and AT mines for 6 .7 percent. Dur-
ing the period of January 2000 ro Janu-
ary 2001, UXO percentages fell to 71.2 
percent, wh ile AP and AT mines rose to 
21.9 and 6.9 percent respectively.' 
This increase is due to a spi llove r 
from the long-running conflict between 
Angolan UNlTA forces and Angolan 
government forces- Forcas Armadas 
Angolanas (FAA)-across rhe northern 
border. In 1999, Namibia granted rhe 
FAA the use ofNDF military bases along 
the border for the purpose of defensive 
attacks against UNITA forces in south-
eastern Angola.·l However, rhe FAA has 
also used these bases for the stockpile and 
transfer of ammunitions, and in irs 2001 
report, the Landmine Monitor stared rhar 
there have been allegations rhar these 
ammunitions include AP and AT mines.3 
Conclusion 
A major problem st ill exists in 
Namibia. UXO and recently placed AP 
mines from the Angolan conflict continue 
to rake innocent lives. The NDF and 
Explosives Unir lack the adequate person-
nel and budget necessary to eradicate the 
problem. Mine awareness campaigns, al-
though very effective, fail to reach rhe 
remote corners of rhe country, the people 
who need ir rhe most. Inconsistent maps 
and minefield reports make 100 percent 
accuracy of mine removal nearly impos-
sible. The once seemingly simple lanclmine 
problem in Namibia has again been com-
plicated. The Namibian government needs 
additional support to once again become 
a "model to Africa and rhe world." • 
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